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For the past thirty-five years, the debate on fundamental tax reform
in the United States has centered on whether some type of consump-
tion tax would replace all or part of the federal income tax. In my
opinion, this debate has now been decided. Given recent budgetary
developments and the impending eligibility of the baby boom genera-
tion for Social Security and Medicare, we cannot dispense with the
revenue from the corporate and individual income tax. Moreover, we
will need huge amounts of additional revenue, and most informed ob-
servers believe that the only plausible source for such revenues is a
federal value-added tax (VAT) enacted in addition to, and not as a
replacement of, the federal income tax.
When a federal consumption tax is considered as an addition to, and
not as a replacement of, the existing income tax, it becomes clear that
a lot of the discussion of consumption taxes in the preceding U.S. de-
bate has been misguided. Consumption tax advocates typically began
by asking how the income tax should be modified to reach only con-
sumption. As a result, consumption tax proposals centered on fea-
tures that derive from the income tax, such as progressivity and entity-
based taxation. The resulting proposals bore little resemblance to ex-
isting VATs around the world. They were designed in large part to
look more like income taxes and therefore perhaps be more politically
acceptable.
Once this central complication is abandoned, it becomes clear that
the United States should not reinvent the wheel. For example, most
earlier consumption tax proposals were subtraction-based (that is,
based on inclusions and deductions, like the income tax)1 rather than
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LLM, the University
of Michigan. I would like to thank all the participants in the American Tax Policy Institute
conference on Structuring a Federal VAT: Design and Coordination Issues (Washington,
DC, Feb. 18-19, 2009), for their contributions to this project. Like many others, I have
learned most of what I know about VATs from the late Oliver Oldman, and this Article is
respectfully dedicated to his memory.
I Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax (2d ed. 1995); The President's Advi-
sory Panel on Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax
System 162-72 (2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/final-re-
portffaxPanel 8-9.pdf.
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credit-invoice based (that is, based on transactions). Almost all ex-
isting VATs, however, are invoice-credit-based, for good reasons (ex-
plored in Itai Grinberg's article2). Another example is that many
consumption tax proposals (like David Bradford's X-Tax and the Flat
Tax3) are origin-based, while all VATs are destination-based. This
feature stems in part from the need to make a subtraction-method
consumption tax WTO-compatible. But as Michael Keen and Walter
Hellerstein explain, destination-based taxes are clearly superior, and
once the U.S. tax is a "normal" invoice-credit VAT, it can be destina-
tion-based as well. 4 Finally, if progressivity issues are addressed by
the income tax, then the consumption tax can be applied at a single
rate, like most modern VATs.
These two issues of the Tax Law Review contain articles and com-
mentary that were originally written for a conference sponsored by
the American Tax Policy Institute and held in Washington, D.C. in
February 2009. The idea behind the conference was that if the United
States were to adopt a VAT as an addition to, and not a replacement
for, the existing federal income tax, we should begin to consider what
such a VAT might look like. Thus, the conference featured some of
the leading VAT experts from around the world, and focused on two
main themes: how to design a federal VAT, and how to coordinate it
with existing state retail sales taxes (RST).
In this Summary I try to summarize the conference contributions
and offer recommendations for designing an add-on federal VAT.
Part II explains why the United States needs a federal VAT. Part III
summarizes the articles dealing with design features of the federal
VAT, and Part IV addresses coordination issues. Part V concludes by
offering specific recommendations.
II. WHY THE UNITED STATES NEEDS AN ADD-ON FEDERAL VAT
The economic crisis of 2008 has significantly worsened the long-
term federal budgetary outlook. Alan Auerbach and William Gale
have estimated that without any new spending programs being en-
acted, the United States faces deficits of over $1 trillion in each of the
next ten years. Over the longer term, the United States faces deficits
2 Itai Grinberg, Where Credit Is Due: Advantages of the Credit-Invoice Method for a
Partial Replacement VAT, 63 Tax L. Rev. 309 (2010).
3 David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 Tax Notes
383 (Apr. 18, 1988); Hall & Rabushka, note 1.
4 Michael Keen & Walter Hellerstein, Interjurisdictional Issues in the Design of a VAT,
63 Tax L. Rev. 359 (2010).
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(in 2009 dollar terms) of $1 to $1.3 trillion each year, or 7-9% of
GDP.5
Rudolph Penner's article clarifies the source and significance of
these numbers. 6 Fundamentally, they result from the aging of the
baby boomer generation. The first baby boomers became eligible for
Social Security in 20087 and will become eligible for Medicare in 2011.
At the same time, medical costs grow at a rate that exceeds growth in
income per capita by about 2% each year.8
Before the current recession, these numbers meant that debt-to-
GDP ratios would be 40% by 2019.9 The financial crisis, however, has
meant that under current projections debt-to-GDP ratios would ex-
ceed 80% of GDP in 2019.10 At these heights, interest payments be-
gin to dominate federal spending. Clearly, that path is unsustainable.
If nothing is done, investors will balk at buying thirty-year Treasury
bonds as early as 2012, because when these bonds mature in 2042,
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will consume the entire fed-
eral budget and nothing will be left over to pay interest.
There are three possible solutions to this situation. The first is to
enact drastic cuts in the entitlement programs. But that is politically
unacceptable and will not happen. In fact, if President Obama has his
way, spending on health care is likely to go up rather than down as
more Americans obtain health insurance. The cost of insuring every
U.S. resident has been estimated to add an additional $1 trillion to the
deficit over the next decade."
The second possibility is to raise additional revenues from the ex-
isting income and payroll taxes. This can be done by raising the rates,
broadening the base, or both. But both base broadening and higher
rates are very unpopular politically, and high income tax rates cause
familiar economic distortions and lead to increased evasion and avoid-
5 Alan Auerbach & William Gale, The Economic Crisis & the Fiscal Crisis: 2009 and
Beyond 2, available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org[UploadedPDF/411843 economic_
crisis.pdf.
6 Rudolf Penner, Do We Need a VAT to Solve our Long-Run Budget Problems, 63 Tax
L. Rev. 301 (2010).
7 Soc. Security Admin., Nation's First Baby Boomer Files for Social Security Retirement
Benefits-Online! (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pressoffice/pr/
babyboomerfiles-pr.htm.
8 Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair, and Comprehen-
sive Tax Plan for the United States, tbl.1.1. (2008).
9 Cong. Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook 5 tbl.1-2 (2007), available at
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8877/12-13-LTBO.pdf.
10 Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 2018,
at 9, 158 tbl.F-11 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8917/01-23-
2008_BudgetOutlook.pdf.
11 John Harwood, Bipartisan Health Bill Is Possible, Leaders Say, N.Y. Times, June 8,
2009, at A12.
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ance. At a time where other countries are cutting income tax rates,
this seems a very implausible choice.
The third option is to enact a VAT. This is what every other OECD
member country has chosen to do under similar circumstances. The
VAT is a proven revenue generator and, in combination with spending
cuts, can resolve our budgetary problem. I believe it is the only realis-
tic solution.
Enacting a VAT will not be easy. Democrats tend to dislike it be-
cause it is regressive, and Republicans because it is a "money ma-
chine." Moreover, past U.S. experience and experience overseas has
indicated that proposing a VAT is politically perilous. Ways and
Means Chair Al Ullman is said to have lost his seat in 1980 over such a
proposal,1 2 and in Canada the Conservative Party went from gov-
erning to total defeat over the VAT.13
But introducing a VAT need not be political suicide. Ullman was
probably defeated for other reasons, and the Conservatives re-
bounded to govern Canada again. More importantly, with good lead-
ership a party can win after introducing the VAT, as evidenced by
John Howard in Australia, who decisively won two elections after the
VAT was introduced.14
Australian political scientist Richard Eccleston has shown that two
elements are necessary for the successful introduction of a VAT.' 5
The first is a consensus by the policymaking elite that this is the right
way to go. Building such a consensus was a major goal of the ATPI
conference, and recent statements by political actors such as Nancy
Pelosi indicate some measure of success. 16 The second is either a
strong push by a politically popular president, preferably in his second
term, or a financial crisis that persuades the majority of the voters that
the VAT is inevitable. I believe that both of these conditions are
likely to be fulfilled by the end of the next decade, and that the United
States will then join the rest of the OECD in enacting a federal VAT.
The remainder of this Article focuses on two issues: first, how to
structure an add-on federal VAT, building on the experience of other
12 See Al Ullman, Former Congressman, Dies at 72, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at A20.
13 See Richard Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Sales Taxes in Canada: The GST-HST-
QST-RST "System," 63 Tax L. Rev. 517 (2010).
14 Kathryn James, We of the "Never Ever": The History of the Introduction of a Goods
and Services Tax in Australia from 1970 to 2005, in 3 Studies in the History of Tax Law 139
(John Tiley ed., 2009).
15 Richard Eccleston, Taxing Reforms (2008); see also Kathryn James, The Politics of
Tax Law Reform: A Comparative Analysis of the Adoption of Value Added Taxes in
Australia, Canada, and the United States, 11 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (forthcoming
2010).
16 See, e.g., Sam Goldfarb, Extending Tax Breaks Could Help Create Jobs, Pelosi Says,
2009 TNT 192-3 (Oct. 7, 2009), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts file.
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OECD countries in designing their VATs. Second, since the United
States is a federal country, how can a federal VAT be coordinated
with state-level RSTs, building on the experience of federal countries
like Canada that have both federal and provincial consumption taxes.
III. STRUCTURAL FEATURES
The first two articles in this Issue focus on two fundamental design
issues that need to be faced when adopting a VAT: Whether the VAT
should be based on the subtraction- or on the credit-invoice method,
and whether it should be destination- or origin-based. Although
there is a consensus in favor of invoice-credit, destination-based
VATs, given the plethora of past proposals for subtraction- and/or
origin-based consumption taxes for the United States, we thought that
it was necessary to address these issues up front.
The following three articles address three fundamental problems
that have faced VATs in other countries: how the VAT should treat
the financial services sector, the housing sector, and the governmental
and nonprofit sector. In each of these areas, older VATs (like the
ones in the European Union) adopt exemptions that are rejected by
more modern VATs like the ones in Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa.
There are two other structural features that are not addressed in
these Issues. The first is whether the VAT should have multiple rates
or exemptions based on the type of good or service being provided.
Such multiple rates and exemptions are common as a way to relieve
the regressivity of the VAT. The better practice, however, is to not
have multiple rates or exemptions, because these apply to the rich as
well as to the poor and lead to endless litigation around item classifi-
cation (Is a donut more like bread or more like candy?). Regressivity
should be addressed in the spending side of the budget (and progres-
sivity should be left to the income and estate taxes).
The second issue is whether to have a small trader exemption. The
standard practice is to have such an exemption on administrative
grounds, but permit small traders to register for the VAT whenever
they have significant input credits (which they cannot recover if they
are exempt). The level of the exemption, like the precise rate of VAT,
are best left to the political process.
A. Subtraction vs. Invoice-Credit Method
In theory, a VAT can be either invoice-credit, subtraction, or addi-
tion-based, and these three methods will reach identical results. With
the exception of Japan, however, every other country that has adopted
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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that a VAT uses the invoice-credit method. Even Japan, which began
by using a version of the subtraction method, has adapted its VAT
over time so that it became a hybrid of the subtraction and credit-
invoice methods.' 7
Given this state of affairs, it would seem highly unlikely for the
United States to consider any method other than the credit-invoice
method. Most consumption tax proposals in the United States, how-
ever, have in fact been based on the subtraction method. The reason
is, as Michael Graetz has observed, that "a subtraction-method VAT
... has the political virtue of looking more like a corporate income
tax," and proponents have wanted to use the VAT as a replacement of
the corporate income tax (as well as part of the individual income
tax).18
Once the VAT is envisaged as an addition to the existing personal
and corporate income taxes, there is no good reason to adopt a sub-
traction-method VAT. The credit-invoice method is superior for
many reasons, explained by Itai Grinberg.19 These include the
following:
* Because a subtraction method VAT is perceived to be entity-
based while the credit-invoice VAT is transaction-based, the for-
mer is more likely to include exemptions for broad sectors of the
economy, such as financial institutions or nonprofit entities, while
the latter is more likely to have exemptions for specific goods and
services, as well as multiple rates. The former type of exemption
is much more pervasive and has significant negative effects (dis-
cussed in other articles in these Issues), while experience has
shown that it is relatively easy to curtail the latter type (many
recently introduced VATS have quite broad bases with minimal
exemptions for specific goods and services and a single rate).
* In order to function properly, a subtraction-method VAT must be
"sophisticated," that is, deductions should be allowed only for
payments to registered VAT traders. But sophisticated VATs
cannot be based on simple summary accounts of sales and
purchases, as envisaged by advocates of the subtraction method.
That is why most U.S. proposals are for naYve or open VATs in
which deductions are allowed for any purchase, but these types of
VATs are fatally flawed and open to abuse.
17 Ministry of Finance, Japan, Comprehensive Handbook of Japanese Taxes 2006, at 172
(2006), available at http://www.mof.go.jplenglish/tax/taxes2006e.htm.
18 Graetz, note 8, at 78.
19 Grinberg, note 2.
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* While it is clear that credit-invoice VATs are WTO-compatible,
there are significant problems regarding the WTO compatibility
of subtraction-method VATs that are also destination-based.
One solution, adopted by some advocates of subtraction-method
consumption taxes in the United States, 20 has been to propose
origin-based taxes, but those are inferior for the reasons dis-
cussed below. The alternative, adopted for instance by the Presi-
dent's Advisory Panel in 2005, is to propose a destination-based
consumption tax and hope that it will be found to be WTO-com-
patible.21 Even the Advisory Panel had doubts, as evidenced by
their refusal to take the revenue gains from adopting destination
basis into account in estimating the revenue impact of their
"Growth and Investment Tax" proposal (which is essentially a
subtraction VAT with an added tax on capital). 22
Grinberg concludes that:
Credit-invoice method VATs thus seem, on balance, more
likely than subtraction-method VATs to be adopted with
VAT design best practices. This is perhaps unsurprising, as
those practices were developed based on fifty years of world-
wide experience with credit-invoice method VATs. As one
author at this conference has written previously, if a VAT
were to be adopted to supplement or partially replace the
income tax, it is not clear why it would be desirable to try to
"reinvent the wheel."23
B. Destination vs. Origin Basis
In theory, a VAT can be either destination- or origin-based. In a
destination-based VAT imports are taxable while exports are zero-
rated. In an origin-based VAT imports are exempt and exports are
taxable.
Every VAT in the world is destination-based. At one point, the EU
considered switching to a modified origin-based system, 24 but that has
been abandoned. A major reason for using the destination basis is
that such border adjustments are WTO-compatible for the standard
20 See, e.g., Hall & Rubushka, note 1.
21 See President's Advisory Panel, note 1.
22 Id. ch. 7.
2 Grinberg, note 2, at 358 (citing Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on Shay and Sum-
mers: Selected International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. Miami
L. Rev. 1085, 1086 (1997).
24 Richard M. Bird & Pierre Pascal Gendron, Dual VATS and Cross-Border Trade: Two
Problems, One Solution, 5 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 429 (1998).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2010] 291
HeinOnline  -- 63 Tax L. Rev. 291 2009-2010
credit-invoice VAT. In fact, the principal reason why some leading
U.S. consumption tax proposals such as the Flat Tax and the X-Tax 25
were origin-based was that they were subtraction-based and also al-
lowed a deduction for wages, which made them WTO-incompatible if
they were destination-based. Once the VAT is not considered as a
replacement for the income tax, there is no reason to allow a deduc-
tion for wages and the tax can be made destination-based.
Micheal Keen & Walter Hellerstein explain some of the reasons to
prefer the destination-based VAT. They conclude that "What though
does economic theory say of the appropriate choice of principle? For
once . . it gives a reasonably clear answer: Though the case is not
unambiguous, the destination principle is noticeably the more
attractive." 26
The reasons are: (1) that destination basis preserves production ef-
ficiency while origin basis preserves consumption efficiency, and the
former generally is regarded as more important than the latter; (2)
that while origin-basis taxes solve the "tourism problem" (shopping
abroad to get lower rates under the destination basis), it suffers from
the same transfer pricing issues as the income tax. The latter is a very
important problem that has bedeviled international taxation for de-
cades, and it seems advisable to avoid it at all costs.
The remainder of Keen and Hellerstein's article is devoted to ex-
ploring some of the issues that arise once destination basis is adopted.
In general, for a country with customs enforcement at the border like
the United States, destination-basis taxation of goods is not problem-
atic. Serious issues remain regarding the taxation of services, but the
OECD has been making significant progress in this area. The conclu-
sion of the OECD is that both B2B and B2C services should be taxed
where the recipient resides,27 and Keen and Hellerstein suggest that
the United States follow this norm, despite the enforcement difficul-
ties in taxing B2C transactions.28
C. Taxation of Financial Services
The VAT treatment of financial services is important because the
financial sector represents 7.9% of U.S. GDP,29 and because it is cru-
2 Bradford, note 3; Hall & Rabushka, note 3.
26 Keen & Hellerstein, note 4, at 362.
27 OECD, Applying VAT/GST to Cross-Border Trade in Services and Intangibles,
Emerging Concepts for Defining Place of Taxation (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/42/11/39874228.pdf.
28 Keen & Hellerstein, note 4, at 405.
29 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Value Added by Industry as a
Percentage of Gross Domestic Product (2009), http://bea.gov/industry/gpotables/gpo-
action.cfm?.
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cial to the functioning of the rest of the economy. Older VAT sys-
tems, such as that of the EU, exempt financial services and insurance
from tax30 because it is administratively difficult to disaggregate the
services element included in intermediation transactions from other
elements like interest that are not subject to VAT. As Alan Schenk
points out in his contribution, exempting financial services and insur-
ance leads to several distortions:31
* The undertaxation of the household consumption of finan-
cial services compared with the consumption of other
goods and services because the value added by financial
institutions is not taxed.
* The overtaxation of the consumption of financial services
by VAT-registered businesses because any VAT buried in
the costs of financial services is not recoverable as input
tax credits. There likely is a cascade of tax resulting when
any VAT buried in these costs is included in the prices of
goods and services sold by the business users of these ex-
empt financial services.
* The incentive for a financial service provider to vertically
integrate and self-supply services in order to avoid some or
all of the unrecoverable VAT on its purchases from regis-
tered domestic traders ....
* The competitive advantage to an offshore financial service
provider if it can render services to domestic household
consumers or other domestic purchasers ... free of VAT. 3 2
Schenk then points out that newer VATs, such as those of New Zea-
land, South Africa, Singapore, and Australia have succeeded in taxing
financial services under an invoice-credit method VAT. Specifically,
the South African and Singapore experiences show that fees for inter-
mediation services can be subject to VAT without leading banks to
bundle them with interest charges that are not subject to tax.3 3
Based on these experiences, Schenk suggests extending the VAT to
financial services and insurance to the extent possible. For financial
services, he proposes that the United States tax all (or almost all) fee-
based financial services, exempting only pure intermediation services
30 Council Directive 2006/112/EC, art. 135, 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1 (EC).
31 Alan Schenk, Taxation of Financial Services (Including Insurance) Under a U.S.
Value-Added Tax, 63 Tax L. Rev. 409 (2010).
32 Id. at 418.
33 Id. at 424-28.
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and other financial services buried in bank charges. Zero-rating
should apply to exported financial services. 34 For insurance, Schenk
recommends including in the VAT base intermediation services ren-
dered by an insurer under both life and nonlife policies.35
D. Treatment of Housing
The tax treatment of housing is crucial because of the importance of
this sector of the economy (housing and related expenditures account
for about 25% of U.S. consumption 36) and because of its political sen-
sitivity. Historically, real estate transactions were exempt from VAT
(as in the EU3 7 ), but this treatment has resulted in significant com-
plexities and distortions. As in the case of financial services, the ex-
emption system leads to cascading and to the blockage of VAT on
inputs going into the construction of commercial real properties.38
Modern VATs like those of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand do
not exempt real estate except for resale of used residential property
(whether owner-occupied or rented) and long-term residential rentals.
All other supplies of real property are taxable, including first sales of
residential properties and short-term rentals. Construction, repair,
and renovations of residential property are taxable with no right to
deduct input tax.39
In his article, Satya Poddar concludes
The objectives of tax neutrality and simplicity require that
the base for the U.S. VAT be comprehensive and include
housing services. While home ownership is viewed as a de-
sirable policy objective, an exemption for housing services is
not necessarily the most efficient incentive for home owner-
ship. Exemptions under a VAT lead to distortions as their
benefit can vary significantly depending upon how the con-
struction and sale of homes is structured. They also create a
bias for horizontal and vertical integration.
Historically, the scope of the VAT was limited to goods
and services, with real property transactions generally ex-
empted from the tax. Increasingly such transactions are be-
3 Id. at 439.
3 Id. at 440.
36 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National Income and Product
Accounts Tables, tbl.2.5.5 (Aug. 20, 2009), available at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipa
web/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N.
37 EU VAT Directive, note 30, art. 136.
38 Satya Poddar, Taxation of Housing Under a VAT, 63 Tax L. Rev. 443 (2010).
39 Id. at 451, 463.
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ing brought within the ambit of a VAT. Under a modern
VAT, all sales and rentals of commercial real property attract
tax. In the case of residential properties, the application of
tax is limited to the first sale of new residential dwellings.
Long-term rentals and resale of residential dwellings are ex-
empted from tax. For dwellings constructed after the com-
mencement of the VAT, this system is tantamount to
precollection of tax on future consumption of housing ser-
vices from such dwellings, resulting in little or no erosion of
the tax base. This is not the case for existing dwellings con-
structed before the introduction of the VAT. Housing ser-
vices flowing from such dwellings remain tax-free, which
constitutes an erosion of the tax base.
No country has gone beyond taxation of first sale of new
residential dwellings. While this option could be viewed as a
reasonable compromise, purely from a technical and tax de-
sign perspective, there are options available for extension of
tax to the existing stock of housing. Under a comprehensive
taxation option, all sales, resales, and rentals of real property
(whether residential or commercial) would be subject to the
VAT, with the exception of imputed rental value of owner-
occupied homes. Such an option warrants a serious consid-
eration in advanced economies such as the United States
where taxpayers (both individuals and corporations) are al-
ready used to reporting residential rental activities for in-
come tax purposes. 40
E. Treatment of Governmental and Nonprofit Bodies
The prevalent treatment of government entities, public sector bod-
ies, nonprofit and charitable organizations, and similar entities (the
PNC sector) under an invoice-credit VAT is exemption. In his article,
Pierre-Pascal Gendron concludes that this treatment is wrong and
leads to significant distortions since the PNC sector amounts to one-
fifth of U.S. GDP.4 1 He surveys the treatment of the sector in modern
VATs and concludes that the best practice is that of Australia and
New Zealand, which treat essentially all supplies of goods and services
by the PNC sector as taxable, with almost no zero-rating or exemp-
40 Id. at 469-70; see also Robert Conrad, Commentary, 63 Tax L. Rev. 471 (2010).
41 Pierre-Pascal Gendron, How Should the United States Treat Government Entities,
Nonprofit Organizations, and Other Tax-Exempt Bodies Under a VAT?, 63 Tax L. Rev.
477, 477-78 (2010).
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tion.42 He prefers this option to the treatment in Canada, which in-
volves ex post rebates of VAT paid by the PNC sector.43
Gendron concludes as follows:
The main lessons for the United States are the following.
First, the case for full taxation of the PNC sector under the
VAT is strong. Second, the Australian-New Zealand model
emerges as the best alternative to the exempt treatment of
PNC sector supplies. Under this model, essentially all the
goods and services supplied by PNC bodies are within the
scope of the VAT and treated like any supplies from the pri-
vate sector. The Australian-New Zealand model features
few instances of zero-rating or exemptions. While the Cana-
dian rebate model works reasonably well, it is complex, it
gives rise to several non-neutralities, and is too gradualist.
Were the United States to adopt a federal VAT, it would
be well advised to get the design right from the start and
subject the sector to the VAT along the lines of the Austra-
lian-New Zealand model and stay as close as possible to full
taxation of the PNC sector-as well as other sectors-under
the VAT. To address the issue of states as taxable persons, it
should modify the model slightly to provide state and local
governments (and only those) with the option to collect tax.
In comparison with the alternatives, this design would result
in the system with the lowest efficiency costs, and possibly
the lowest compliance and administrative costs.44
IV. COORDINATION ISSUES
A. The Canadian Example
Canada has four main types of consumption tax: (1) the federal
VAT introduced in 1991-the Goods and Services Tax (GST); (2) the
extension of the GST in 1997 to three small eastern provinces-the
Harmonized Sales Tax (HST), which will also apply from 2010 in On-
tario; (3) the unique provincial VAT introduced in 1991 in the prov-
ince of Qu6bec-the Qu6bec Sales Tax (QST); (4) the provincial sales
tax that continues to exist in most other provinces-the retail sales tax
(RST).45
42 Id. at 478.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 507-08; see also Michel Aujean, Commentary, 62 Tax L. Rev. 509 (2010).
45 Bird & Gendron, note 13, at 519 tbl.1.
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Richard Bird and Pierre-Pascal Gendron argue that this combina-
tion of consumption taxes has important lessons for the Untied States
were it to adopt an add-on federal VAT. Specifically, they note that:
For decades, academics had argued almost unanimously
that one could not impose a standard invoice-credit destina-
tion-based value added tax (VAT) at the subnational level of
government. Canada's almost two decades of experience
demonstrates conclusively that this view is incorrect: Not
only can it be done, but it has been done, and done well.
Moreover, Canadian experience also demonstrates that a
federal VAT can work perfectly well in a country in which
some subnational units have their own VATs, some have
their own retail sales taxes (RSTs), and some have no sales
tax at all.46
Thus, the main lesson to be drawn from the Canadian experience is
that "the existence or nonexistence of subnational retail sales taxes is,
in both technical and economic terms, a matter of indifference when
considering a federal VAT." 47
This lesson from a neighboring country with extensive historical,
cultural, and trade links to the United States is extremely important.
For a long time, the argument that a federal VAT would be inconsis-
tent with or preempt the state and local RST has been a major obsta-
cle in adopting a federal VAT in the United States. The Canadian
experience shows that this argument is simply wrong. There is noth-
ing about the fact that most U.S. states rely on the RST to prevent the
federal government from adopting a VAT.
Given the historical traditions of federalism and the strong desire of
the states to maintain their tax sovereignty, it seems likely that at least
in the short run most states would wish to keep their existing tax struc-
ture that relies on the RST even as the federal government adopts the
VAT. The Canadian example shows that they can do so with no sig-
nificant economic problems.
Nevertheless, given that the state RSTs are deeply flawed taxes, it
would make sense for states to ultimately use the opportunity af-
forded by the federal VAT to also switch to a state VAT. The experi-
ence of Ontario, the largest Canadian province, shows that this is a
viable option.
46 Id. at 517 (footnote omitted).
47 Id.
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B. Lessons from Other Economic Unions and Federations
In contrast with Canada, the lessons that can be learned from other
economic unions and federations seem less relevant to the United
States. Sijbren Cnossen's article reviews the experience of the EU,
while Victoria Perry surveys other federal countries such as Brazil and
India.48 The EU experience is with a harmonized VAT, since under
the EU directives each Member State has to adopt a VAT and follow
the general framework of the directives in designing the base and
rates of the tax.49 This seems an unlikely model for the United States
to follow. The EU experience is, however, important in pointing out
some of the pitfalls that lie in the way of designing a VAT where there
are no borders, which Charles McLure builds upon in his recommen-
dations for the states.50 Importantly, most of the fraud problems that
plague the EU, such as carousel fraud, arise because of open borders
and are not relevant to the federal VAT.
C. How to Coordinate State and Local RSTs with a Federal VAT
McLure's article represents a comprehensive attempt at envisaging
how the U.S. states that wish to switch from the RST to a VAT could
do so once a federal VAT is in place.5' McLure concludes as follows:
* The VAT is clearly superior to the RST for the federal
government.
* States may switch to the VAT over time.
* States that do not switch to the VAT may benefit from imple-
menting the "integrated sales tax," an RST administered by the
federal government.
* Conformity of requirements for registration is crucial for admin-
istrative cooperation.
* Administrative cooperation would be enhanced if the bases of the
federal VAT and state RST were conformed.
48 Sijbren Cnossen, VAT Coordination in Common Markets and Federations: Lessons
from the European Experience, 63 Tax L. Rev. 583 (2010); Victoria J. Perry, International
Experience in Implementing VATs in Federal Jurisdictions: A Summary, 63 Tax L. Rev.
623 (2010).
49 EU VAT Directive, note 30, art. 1.
50 Charles E. McLure, Jr., How to Coordinate State and Local Sales Taxes with a Fed-
eral Value-Added Tax, 63 Tax L. Rev. 639 (2010).
51 Id.; see also Harley Duncan, Administrative Mechanisms to Aid in the Coordination
of State and Local Retail Sales Taxes with a Federal Value-Added Tax, 63 Tax L. Rev. 715
(2010).
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* Local reliance on RST is not a barrier to state adoption of a VAT.
* The federal government could encourage state conformity by
overriding the constitutional limits on state taxation of remote
sellers for those states that conform to the VAT base.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations reached by the previous articles in these Is-
sues can be summarized as follows:
(1) The United States should adopt a federal VAT in addition to,
and not as a replacement of, the federal income tax (Avi-
Yonah). It should not adopt a federal RST (McLure, Cnossen).
(2) The federal VAT should be based on the invoice-credit method,
not the subtraction method (Grinberg).
(3) The federal VAT should be destination-based, not origin-based
(Keen and Hellerstein).
(4) Fee-based financial services and intermediation services by in-
surers should be taxable (Schenk).
(5) All supplies of real estate other than resales of residential prop-
erty and long-term rentals should be taxable (Poddar).
(6) Goods and services supplied by public sector bodies, nonprofit
organizations and charities should be taxable (Gendron).
(7) The federal VAT can be adopted without regard to whether the
states maintain the RST or switch to a VAT (Cnossen,
McLure).
Of these, I believe the most important conclusion is the last one, be-
cause the belief that adopting a federal VAT would harm the states
has long been an impediment to federal tax reform. Of the others, the
second and third represent a clear consensus, and once the federal
VAT is seen as a stand-alone tax and not as a replacement for the
income tax, they should follow without much debate. The fourth,
fifth, and sixth recommendations are on the other hand, likely to be
the subject of intense lobbying and therefore less likely to be adopted.
Nevertheless, it is important to establish best practices in these areas
as a beginning point for future legislative efforts.
Whatever the outcome at the detail level, I believe that the time has
clearly come for U.S. tax policymakers to focus on the best way to
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design a federal VAT. The most likely scenario for such a move would
be a fiscal crisis caused by the exploding federal deficit. In such a
crisis there will not be a lot of time to get the details right, and the
VAT would be rushed through Congress. Thus, we should not wait for
a crisis to occur to think about the details. This Issue represents an
attempt to start planning for such an eventuality. Hopefully, it will
mark the beginning of a fruitful discussion.
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